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 György Lukács’s Marxist phase is usually associated with his passage from neo-
Kantianism to Hegelianism. Nonetheless, Nietzschean influences have been 
covertly present in Lukács’s philosophical development, particularly in his 
uncompromising distaste for the bourgeois society and the mediocrity of its 
quotidian values. A closer glance at Lukács’s corpus discloses that the influence 
of Nietzsche has been eclipsed by the Hegelian turn in his thought. Lukács hardly 
ever mentions the weight of Nietzsche on his early thinking, an influence that 
makes cameo appearances throughout his lifetime writings. During the period of 
his adherence to a Stalinist approach to communism, his new subjectivity seems 
to be re-constituted through a disavowal of his earlier romantic anti-capitalism. 
Implicit in Lukács’s attack on Nietzsche in the Destruction of Reason (1952) is an 
acerbic reaction to the mute presence of the latter in his earlier thought. Apart 
from his ignorance of the unreliability of the collection of the Will to Power 
edited by Peter Gast and Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, his battle against the anti-
proletariat Nietzsche in the Destruction is waged on a metaphysical, non-historical 
plain.1 Lukács’s pre-Marxist works (Soul and Form, On Poverty of Spirit, and The 
Theory of the Novel) in a sense betray the instance of a writer who writes most of 
someone where he omits his name. Thus perceived, Lukács’s early corpus lends 
itself to a symptomatic reading.
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This essay seeks to extract the Nietzschean undercurrents of Lukács’s work 
through a reflection on the romantic anti-capitalist tendencies that the young 
Lukács shared with Nietzsche. For although it may appear that Nietzsche lacked 
a clear politics, his criticism of the bourgeois ethos as a structure based on debt/
guilt [Schuld], and his critique of modern value-system and nihilism paved the 
way for the emergence of Lukács’s theory of reification. Nietzsche’s category 
of ‘transvaluation of values’ suggests a total transfiguration of reality, a radical 
rupture with the ordinary state of things, and as such carries within itself a 
revolutionary promise. 
Drawing a distinction between political romanticism and romantic politics, I 
argue that romantic anti-capitalism contains a potential for the latter. The essay 
further traces the link between Lukács’s ‘romantic politics’ and the persistence 
of a thought of the tragic (a ‘tragic vision’) in his texts that, despite its temporary 
decline during his realist period, is undismissable in different constellations of his 
thought. 
ROMANTIC ANTI-CAPITALISM REVISITED
And because nature and fate have never been so terrifyingly soulless as they 
are today, because men’s souls have never walked in such utter loneliness upon 
deserted paths, because of all of this we may again hope for the coming of 
tragedy—once all the dancing shadows of a friendly order which our cowardly 
dreams have cast upon nature to allow us a false sense of security, have entirely 
disappeared.
—Lukács, Soul & Form2 
In Thomas Mann’s novel, The Magic Mountain, Naphta speaks of “a fascinating 
double meaning” in Romanticism that incorporates both reaction and revolution.3 
This character was modelled on Lukács.4 Even though Lukács never recognized 
himself in Naphta (at one point expressing his distance from him as well as 
Nietzsche), he represents the ‘romantic anti-capitalism’ that Lukács initially 
associated with Dostoevsky (1931), suggesting a moral, aesthetic, and political 
criticism of bourgeois culture as grounded on pre-capitalist social classes 
and cultural values.5 Even in the neo-Romanticism of the Heidelberg Circle—
particularly in the work of Max Weber and Georg Simmel—Lukács gleaned a 
fascination with the so-called lost unity of the pre-capitalist world. In a spirit of 
auto-critique, Lukács attributed the same qualities to his own early works. Yet, 
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apart from the unfairness of the older Lukács’s judgment of these early writings 
and the philosophical disposition behind them, they undoubtedly did represent 
romantic anti-capitalist thought, an observation most succinctly developed in 
Michael Löwy’s book on Lukács. Löwy rightly notes that unlike Marx’s conception 
of a determined economic formation or instances of ‘primitive communism’ as 
pre-capitalist models, Lukács was more enthusiastic about “the Homeric universe 
of ancient Greece; Russian literary or religious spirituality; Christian, Hindu, or 
Jewish mysticism.”6
In a sense, Lukács’s later objections against the notion of romantic anti-capitalism 
and its historical ambivalence—which he shares with some Marxists—mostly 
spring from the limitations of an orthodox interpretation of historical materialism 
and its tendency to accentuate the ‘pre-modern’ or pre-bourgeois character of 
this category in order to strip it of all subversive capacities. Once revolution and 
progress were merely deemed as modern events with the industrial working class 
as the only subject of dissensus, any pre-modern form of subversion would be 
labelled as reactionary. Even so, there are critical debates within Marxism that 
take issue with this tendency in historical materialism, arguing that pre-modern 
structures had not been devoid of revolutionary and egalitarian qualities. Silvia 
Federici’s conception of capitalism as a counter-revolution that suppressed the 
revolutionary movements of the peasantry and the heretics against feudalism is 
an instance that puts stress on the subversive, radical, and egalitarian quality of 
these pre-capitalist movements.7 Such a historical trajectory that refuses to regard 
revolution as merely a modern phenomenon is requisite for conjuring up the 
possibilities within the notion of romantic anti-capitalism, rescuing it from the 
criticisms pitted against it—particularly Lukacs’s condemnation of this concept 
in the 1967 preface to his seminal History and Class Consciousness.
History and Class Consciousness (1923) indeed stumbles at the threshold between 
Lukács’s early romantic anti-capitalist phase and the later realist one. Already 
in this work he assumes some distance from Romanticism, claiming that after 
Rousseau the concept of organic growth had regressed from a protest against 
reification into a “reactionary slogan.”8  Although it is true that Lukács’s stance 
towards Romanticism went through many ups and downs, his robust opposition 
to the idea emerged in his later Stalinist phase. A prelude to this opposition could 
be gleaned in his enthusiastic review of Carl Schmitt’s Political Romanticism in 
which a young Schmitt rebukes excessive subjectivism and aestheticism of the 
Romantics. Although the accusation of excessive aestheticism is partly true and in 
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a sense reminiscent of Hegel’s account of ‘the Beautiful Soul,’ Schmitt and Lukács 
over-exaggerate the extent of romantic depoliticization. Nonetheless, Schmitt 
draws a distinction between political romanticism and romantic politics that I 
would like to dwell upon. Schmitt’s book targeted the political romanticism of 
those who had just come to power in the new Weimar Republic, describing how 
the German bourgeoisie was inflicted with passivity in politics precisely due to its 
romantic proclivity. Schmitt connects political passivity to what he refers to as 
the “occasionalist” essence of Romanticism:
… [T]he romantic sense of the world and life can be combined with the 
most diverse political circumstances and with antithetical philosophical 
theories. As long as the Revolution is present, political romanticism 
is revolutionary. With the termination of the Revolution, it becomes 
conservative … This variability of political content is not accidental. On the 
contrary, it is a consequence of the occasionalist attitude, and it is deeply 
rooted in the nature of the romantic, the essence of which is passivity.9
As such, “[w]here political activity begins, political romanticism ends.”10 Contra 
to political romanticism, however, romantic politics is to be found in a person 
who is not essentially a romantic, but can be “motivated by romanticized ideas … 
[placing] his energy, which flows from other sources, at their disposal.”11Whereas 
in the subjectified occasionalism of  political romanticism occasion is the cause, 
here “the effect, the terminus ad quem,” is occasional.  An event takes on a 
romantic bent when an occasional object “is imputed to an important political 
intent that is to be taken seriously.”12 For Schmitt, Don Quixote is the immortal 
type of this form of politics, the romantic political figure par excellence. Rather 
than seeking the “higher harmony” of the political romanticism, Don Quixote can 
actually make a decision regarding the right and wrong, moving beyond the political 
romantic’s passivity towards the problem of justice, beyond the attempt to 
dissolve the contradictions through their aestheticization or instrumentalization 
for the exercise of romantic imagination. It is the very indignation over supposed 
injustice that drives Don Quixote to bracket external reality, and yet, he does 
not recoil aesthetically into his own subjectivity, “composing complaints for a 
criticism of the present.”13 He gets entangled in real treacherous battles rather 
than immersing himself in the so-called battle of ‘the higher sort’ such as the 
battle of the artist with his material. Even his infatuation with Dulcinea—indeed, 
with his ‘idea’ of Dulcinea—is a source of inspiration that compels him to commit 
great deeds. Thus perceived, in contrast to the ‘ambivalence’ that both thinkers 
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find in Romanticism, romantic politics rests upon the ability to make a decision 
and a great degree of ironic heroism. On the whole, this distinction seems to go 
back to the difference between Romanticism as a historical period or tradition 
and ‘the romantic’, more or less defined as a concept whose reference is unreal or 
fictional. Schmitt in fact draws attention to the etymological meaning of romantic 
or romanhaft as ‘fictitious.’14 
As a spiritual, more or less mystical Weltanschauung, Romanticism is closely 
intertwined with philosophical thought, and in a sense the ambivalence in what 
the Naphta character calls “a fascinating double meaning” merging revolution 
and reaction is not only a romantic syndrome, but also a malady of philosophy 
itself. As for the ambivalence in the notion of romantic anti-capitalism, after 
WWI this ambiguity began to fade as the difference between the revolutionary 
and the reactionary proponents of this concept became palpable. According to 
Fehér and Wikoff, with the emergence of WWI, “romantic anti-capitalism, which 
could function undisturbed only as mere cultural criticism, had to abandon its 
disguise and show its true colours. It had to unequivocally show how seriously it 
took its anti-capitalist stance.”15 Under these circumstances, thinkers like Lukács 
and Bloch retained their fidelity to emancipation through rejecting the war, whilst 
figures as diverse as Weber, Simmel, Ernst, and Mann chose to support the war.16 
Lukács’s commentators thus have been able to pinpoint the members of the two 
camps—revolutionary and reactionary—as a means to highlight the Janus-faced 
nature of the category of romantic anti-capitalism and ultimately Romanticism 
itself. Nevertheless, rather than being realized in opposite camps, this “fascinating 
double meaning” can be met in one thinker, and Nietzsche is perhaps the first figure 
that emerges under this light: the figure accused of being a precursor theorist of 
Nazism (even in Lukács’s Destruction), whilst simultaneously embraced for his 
anti-capitalist, aristocratic rebellion (as most forcefully argued by Domenico 
Losurdo). Although for Lukács in the mid 1950s the fate of Nietzsche was fused 
with that of romantic anti-capitalism (his attempts to wash his hands clean from 
one was accompanied with his desire to dissociate himself from the other), it 
appears that the Nietzschean Lukács carries within himself a pledge for which we 
can throw the dice.
LIFE AGAINST LIFE: TRAGIC SUBJECT AND THE ASCETIC IDEAL
To throw the human soul out of joint, plunging it into terror, frosts, fires and 
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raptures to such an extent that it rids itself of all small and petty forms of 
lethargy, apathy and depression, as though hit by lightning.
—Nietzsche, Genealogy17 
 
To recapitulate, Schmitt and Lukács were both concerned with the political 
ambivalence of Romanticism, a predicament equally detectable in the category of 
romantic anti-capitalism before WWI. Nonetheless, I would argue that even prior 
to the clarification occasioned by the war the notion of romantic anti-capitalism 
had already carried within itself a promise, namely, the moment we have described 
as ‘romantic politics.’ This moment was present in Nietzsche’s corpus and is the 
meeting point between him and the young Lukács. In this section, I attempt to 
extract the Nietzschean undertones of Lukács’s early work, meanwhile trailing 
the tendency towards a romantic politics in their thoughts.  
Perhaps, no idea or concept in Lukács’s early writings is more Nietzschean than 
the concept of life. In late Nietzsche, the concept of power is not reducible to a 
political category ( just as the concept of will is not reducible to a psychological 
category), but instead evokes an excess or surplus in life. Power denotes what 
in life is more than life, thus indicating the level of intensity of existence. It is 
precisely this Nietzschean trajectory on life that informs Lukács’s theorization 
in Soul and Form (1910). Resonant in the distinction between two kinds of life 
in the essay, “The Metaphysics of Tragedy,” is the Nietzschean evaluation of life 
in terms of intensity, that is, the difference between passive nihilism and active 
nihilism as two forms of life.18 Ordinary life in this essay corresponds to passive 
nihilism. Nothing is ever quite fulfilled in ordinary life: “To live is to live something 
through to the end: but life means that nothing is ever fully and completely 
lived through to the end. Life is the most unreal and unliving of all conceivable 
existences …”19 Since ‘real’  life is impossible in the midst of ordinary, empirical 
life, one “has to deny life in order to live.”20 Whilst ordinary life is amorphous, 
never wholly lived out and only explicable in denials, living within the periphery 
of tragedy—translatable to active nihilism—is pregnant with the capacity for not 
merely negation, but re-evaluation of ordinary life. We are unmistakably within 
Nietzschean territories here. 
Tragedy happens at the threshold between a yearning for unconditional values 
and the empirical, “corrupt and corrupting world.”21Convergence of tragic life 
with empirical life, therefore, can only bear a disaster in the same way that, in 
psychoanalytic terms, realization or actualization of fantasy can only manifest 
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itself in a nightmare. In the eyes of the tragic hero all true encounters follow the 
category of ‘all or nothing,’ which, spurns the more and the less, rejects all degrees 
and transitions.
For the man who is aware of his condition, there are only the extremes 
of the authentic and the inauthentic, the true and the false, the just and 
the unjust, value and non-value; there is no point in-between. However, 
such a man faces a world in which absolute value is never encountered; 
everything there is relative and, as such, non-existent and totally devoid 
of value.22
Hence, the chasm between two irreconcilable kinds of life, between pure, tragic, 
‘living’ [lebendige] life and empirical ‘unliving’ life.23 In tragic life, all relationships 
of ordinary life are rooted out, a phenomenological subtraction through which 
the relation to destiny may be established.24 Notwithstanding the presence of 
Erlebnis in this essay, this treatment of the concept of life is not reducible to 
an example of Weber’s and Simmel’s Lebensphilosophie. This is the moment of 
romantic politics, the Nietzschean Lukács, at his best—the target of his later 
criticism and disavowal in The Destruction of Reason. Nothing could be held more 
responsible for Lukács’s future preference for the worst socialism over the best 
capitalism than the sedimentation of this desire for ‘all-or-nothing’ in his thought. 
The postulation of a gap between the living and the unliving is a stride away from 
reconciliation towards the resolution of a contradiction between the two that 
cannot be subsumed in a higher synthesis.
This irreconcilability between two kinds of life is palpable in the majority of 
essays collected in Soul and Form. So perceived, in the tragic vision of Lukács’s 
neo-Kantian phase (often interpreted as an early manifestation of the 20th century 
existentialism), we can detect the presence of Nietzsche, most accentuated in 
Lukács’s conceptualization of the truth of tragedy as an interruption of ordinary 
life. The counter-nature25quality of the Lukácsian tragic hero also brings to mind 
Nietzsche’s ascetic priest for whom excessive enjoyment becomes an antidote to 
“long-drawn-out pain and boredom,”26 reaching out beyond the pleasure principle. 
In other words, self-flagellation and self-sacrifice of the ascetic priest are at heart 
a battle against ordinary life (the formlessness of ordinary life, in Lukács’s terms). 
Just as the tragic hero has to deny empirical life in order ‘to live’ (i.e., to strive 
for an excess in life), so is the acetic priest compelled to reject ordinary life for 
the sake of a more intense existence. Nietzsche refers to this tendency as “life 
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against life.”27 This will to counter-nature and conflict [Zwiespältigkeit] breeds 
joy and becomes more self-assured and triumphant as “its own condition, the 
physiological capacity to live, decreases.”28 
The “sleepless, glowing, burned out, exhausted and yet not tired”29 body of the 
ascetic priest is suggestive of the pursuit of joy in pain, a “passion for the real” 
in Alain Badiou’s terms.30 Asceticism here has not much to do with moderation 
and temperance, but rather with excess of tragic passion. It goes beyond the 
pleasure principle, reeling on a path where pain becomes pleasure: “Even when 
he wounds himself, this master of destruction, self-destruction,—afterwards it is 
the wound itself that forces him to live…”31 As Zupančič puts it, pain and suffering 
are not merely “burdens that a true Christian (who, in Nietzsche’s argument, can 
very well be an ‘atheist Christian’) stoically endures; they are, rather, something 
in relation to which a Christian comes to life as a subject.”32 In a similar vein, 
Lukács’s tragic hero seems to become a subject in the ethereal air of tragedy, where 
“naked souls conduct a dialogue with naked destinies.”33 At issue is the emergence 
of the subject at the wake of an event. As Lukács writes, “The soul, having become 
Self, measures its whole previous existence with a stranger’s eye. It finds that 
previous existence incomprehensible, inessential, and lifeless.”34 The tragic hero 
resembles the ascetic figure who, in the words of Nietzsche, would prefer to will 
nothingness rather than not will,35 transcending the paralysis of the will (which 
for both Nietzsche and Lukács was emblematic of the bourgeois individual).36 Like 
Nietzsche, the young Lukács was engrossed in the modern problem of the absence 
of will, a preoccupation that persisted as late as his theorization of reification in 
History and Class Consciousness, where he describes the individual as will-less [Wil-
lenslos] under capitalism.37 
Although the image of Nietzsche as a detester of priests is hard to overcome, we 
should not forget that his most agreeable character, Zarathustra, was immersed 
in the logic of the ascetic ideal. The same contradiction that drives the Lukácsian 
tragic hero is at work in the pursuit of the ascetic ideal: “[T]his ascetic priest, 
this apparent enemy of life, this negating one,—he actually belongs to the really 
great conserving and yes-creating forces of life…”38 In a word, the ascetic priest is 
an active nihilist.  The aforementioned logic of the ‘either/or’ implies that the 
act emerges as a radical rupture or definitive transgression from the ordinary 
state of things. In this sense, the ‘either/or’ is not a modality of future (contra 
the Heideggerian confrontation with nihilism in terms of “only a god can save 
us”), but rather of past and present. The tragic hero and the ascetic priest become 
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a subject retroactively at the wake of an event that “is what determines and is 
determined: it bursts incalculably into life, accidentally and out of context, and 
ruthlessly turns life into a clear, unambiguous equation—which it then resolves.”39 
Nietzsche resorts to the metaphor of ‘lightning’ to explain the singularity of this 
modality of existence. 
At stake is the creation of a criterion of valuation in opposition to the reality 
principle. In the context of the Lukácsian tragic hero, we could contend that 
the tragic nature of the act arises from the transformation of the act into the 
transcendental condition of the subject’s desire, since, in the grips of nihilism, 
the will is left with no objects except its own transcendental condition. 40 It is 
only through the tragic act that what is excluded from the given, or that which, in 
Adorno’s terms, “falls on the wayside” actually becomes possible. The sublimation 
in the act stems from its attribution of value to what is hitherto devoid of value 
or meaning. This, once again, indicates that there are no shades in between. This 
idea of ‘valuation’ is also at the core of Nietzsche’s logic of the ascetic ideal.41 
This parallel reading of two irreconcilable forms of life in the work of both thinkers 
hints at their predilection for romantic politics. To reiterate, this predilection, 
which is reflected in Nietzsche’s ascetic priest and Lukács’s tragic hero, can be 
captured in their repugnance for the ambivalence and formlessness of ordinary 
life, distaste for passivity and indecision, adherence to the ‘either/or,’ refusal of 
aesthetic withdrawal, and on the whole, the tendency to grapple with the problem 
of nihilism rather than remaining a nagging spectator. In what follows I will 
further explore the footprints of Nietzsche on Lukács’s corpus. 
FROM THE ABSENCE OF GOD TO THE ABSENCE OF HUMAN ACTIVITY
The thought of young Lukács is steeped in a form of negativity that resonates with 
Nietzsche’s state of mind concerning the ‘nihilist’ Europe. This negativity could be 
glimpsed in his total lack of consensus with the state of things, his philosophical 
abnegation of any kind of reconciliation or synthesis, and his rebellion against 
Christianity, bourgeoisie, and even the actually existing socialism of his time 
(i.e., German social democracy that he detested with a Nietzschean fervour).42 
His rejection of the bourgeois society or modernity as the age of “absolute 
sinfulness” and his idea of a leap towards “a new epoch of world history” in The 
Theory of the Novel (1916) is closer to Nietzsche’s active nihilism as revaluation of 
values than Heidegger’s half-hearted godlessness or even the negative religiosity 
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of Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard with whom the romantic anti-capitalism of his 
youth is usually associated.43 We can locate the philosophical stance of the young 
Lukács at the threshold between a Kantian, tragic view (where Kant regards the 
modern civilization as the “glittering misery”44) and a Nietzschean affirmation of 
tragedy or acceptance of the non-reconcilability of subject and object as a kind of 
amor fati or gay science, which at moments supersedes the Kantian melancholic 
science. This fusion of negative mysticism and vitalism,45 which coagulates into 
absolute negation of bourgeois values, runs through The Theory of the Novel. It is 
precisely this value-oriented, ethical standpoint that later on falls under the axe of 
his self-criticism—i.e., in the wake of his political compromise, and his uncritical 
acceptance of the primacy of economy and Lenin’s anaemic reflection theory. 
The form of The Theory of the Novel shares more than a few similarities with 
Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy. Apart from the fact that both works focus on 
the occurrence of a literary form (the novel and tragedy, respectively), this 
development in both cases entails a fascination with ancient Greece and advances 
through a reflection on the epic form. Furthermore, both works are redolent with 
Kantianism and fall prey to their writers’ auto-critique later in life. However, as 
maintained before, the philosophical affinity drawn between the two thinkers in 
this essay addresses the influence of later Nietzsche on Lukács. In this context, I 
suggest that even the conceptualization of the famous category of ‘second nature,’ 
initially coined in The Theory of the Novel and later elaborated in History and 
Class Consciousness, would not have been possible in the absence of Nietzsche’s 
influence. 
In The Theory of the Novel, the notion of second nature, as “the nature of man-made 
structures”46 is indicative of a world that “does not offer itself either as meaning 
to the aim-seeking subject or as matter, in sensuous immediacy, to the active 
subject.”47 So in the words of Lukács: “This second nature is not dumb, sensuous 
and yet senseless like the first: it is a complex of senses—meanings—which has 
become rigid and strange, and which no longer awakens interiority; it is a charnel-
house of long-dead in-teriorities…”48 Being made “as a prison instead of a parental 
home,” the realization of the concept of second nature gives rise to a sense of 
estrangement (oddly coupled with modern sentimentalism) from the first nature, 
which is but a projection of the experience of a man-made world. It stands for 
“meaningless laws in which no relation to the soul can be found.”49 Detectable in 
these passages is first and foremost the experience of nihilism, best expounded in 
the work of Nietzsche. The concept of second nature implies the loss of meaning 
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or value, but it is precisely this loss of the object—which in a sense never existed—
that could transform nostalgia into a capacity for affirmative action. Even though 
it is to Novalis that the early passages of The Theory of the Novel pays tribute, 
Lukács’s godless world, as Moretti aptly puts it, does not so much suffer from 
the absence of God as the absence of human activity.50 This insight chimes with 
Lukács’s own impression of Tintoretto’s Crucifixion, in his assertion that in this 
painting humans are more immersed in their own affairs than in God or even 
Christ’s suffering.51 The tragic dimension, however, is palpable in the debasement 
of humans in such a world, a debasement that uncannily accompanies the absence 
of human activity. The romantic anti-capitalist overtones in this text betray 
themselves in the way he chides the de-territorialization (what he describes as the 
‘unboundedness’) of modern society for making a return to the old society —as a 
closed totality—impossible. 
The radical leftism that follows this early period—as crystallized in Tactics and 
Ethics (1919)—is still suffused with his tragic, Nietzschean ethics, for it relies on 
the ‘active,’ Faustian affirmation of the false values of bourgeois life, never settling 
for pacifism. He contends in an article of the same title that in certain tragic 
situations one is compelled to sacrifice the ethics of one’s ego on the grand altar 
of a historical mission, a murderous act that is tragically moral.52 What he calls the 
tragedy of communism (i.e., only through becoming evil could the communists 
defeat the domination of evil) entails transformation through acceptance and as 
such is comparable to Nietzsche’s notion of an active, creative acceptance of 
nihilism. On the whole, Lukács’s work in his Marxist period still leans towards 
an ethico-political preoccupation with value, and at best, the transvaluation of 
values. This, once again, shows that a mere tracing of Lukács’s thought back to 
Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky—let alone Hegel, whose influence is indisputable—
in the absence of Nietzsche tends to neglect a great deal. “The reversal of all 
values”, or transvaluation of all values, is the true subversive act for Nietzsche, 
the act that overcomes the Christian value-judgment. This transvaluation or 
counter-evaluation of values, as Nancy asserts in his interpretation of Nietzsche, 
does not merely vanquish or devalorize values, but entirely revolutionizes them. 
Its aim is a fundamental transfiguration of circumstances.53  
It is worthwhile to notice that Nietzsche arrives at the notion of value through 
the category of exchange. Through a numerical conception of value, Nietzsche 
problematizes the relativity of value, that value always entails comparison and 
hierarchization. Through Beyond Good and Evil to Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche 
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assumes a re-evaluation of the concept of value (of goods, drives, and humans). 
Value is thus intimately connected to life, and is requisite for decisions. As he puts 
it in Daybreak, “All the actions may be traced back to evaluations.”54 The same 
echoes are present in the thought of the young Lukács, “…there is a value-judgment 
in everything that has been given form.”55 Intermingled with the recognition of 
the urgency of values for quotidian life is Nietzsche’s criticism of the good and 
evil dichotomy precisely for its involvement with hierarchical orders of values, 
i.e. a ranking based on appetites and aversions. The degrees of the intensity of 
good or evil actions are at stake here. Granting low value to certain actions and 
pushing them towards the category of evil never ceases to be accompanied with a 
demeaning of humans or granting them low value. 
“One Law for the Lion and Ox is Oppression.”56 Blake’s well-known statement 
expresses the common root of Nietzsche’s and Lukács’s critique of bourgeois 
values: measurement, management, and manipulation of all values or differences 
through their forced incorporation into wholly abstract, quantified, and rule-
bound systems. For, as Lukács notes in History and Class Consciousness, “[T]he 
unmediated juxtaposition of natural laws and imperatives is the logical expression 
of immediate societal existence in bourgeois society.”57 In this book, Lukács shifts 
our attention to a parallax in value-theory between the productivist Marx (via a 
political-economic take on value) and the meta-ethical Nietzsche (via a social 
trajectory on value). Moreover, even in this text (his most Hegelian moment, so to 
say), Lukács is still under the spell of his early Nietzschean tragic vision once he 
dresses up the proletariat in the costumes of the novelistic hero. The singularity 
of his Hegelian Marxism indeed arises from his tragic bringing together of Hegel 
and Marx in a non-mediated fashion, where the space between Hegel and Marx 
is not occupied by Feuerbach and the left Hegelians. I would argue that it is 
precisely this persistence of Lukács’s early romantic anti-capitalism and tragic 
vision in History and Class Consciousness that rescues this work from the grips 
of dogmatic objectivism and economic determinism. The promising Nietzschean 
moment manifests itself in Lukács’s entanglement with the antinomies of 
bourgeois thought as a critique and transvaluation of values of bourgeoisie—
whose ‘sickness’ Nietzsche had originally prescribed—rather than an objectivist, 
economistic approach.
THE ETERNAL RETURN OF REACTION
Our discussion built upon the ‘double-meaning of revolution and reaction,’ as 
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associated, conceptually and historically, with the term, ‘romantic anti-capitalism’ 
(coined by Lukács who also used it to criticize his own earlier work). It would 
therefore be pertinent to briefly look at some instances of the reactionary aspect of 
Nietzsche’s and Lukács’s oeuvre. The fragment called The European Nihilism from 
Nietzsche’s late notebooks is most significant in the way it offers a constellation 
of his central ideas from the eternal return to the will to power, whilst presenting 
the notion of the eternal return as the apex of the process of self-destruction of 
Christian morality. Nietzsche’s idea of the “hierarchy of forces” [die Rangordnung 
der Kräfte]58 in this text crystallizes in his depiction of the figure of the ones 
whose action is destructive [schlechtweggekommen]. Nietzsche locates the latter in 
all social classes.59 In §§ 9-15, a formulation of nihilism is put forward according 
to which morality belongs to people who are violated and oppressed by people 
(rather than nature and time, as portrayed in Thus Spoke Zarathustra): “…for it is 
powerlessness in the face of people, not powerlessness in the face of nature, that 
generates the most desperate embitterment against existence.”60This substitution 
of people for nature means the threat no longer comes from finitude and an all-
pervasive nature, but from the oppression suffered by certain people from certain 
oppressors.
Just as Hegel’s master, whose winning card is bravery at the face of death, 
Nietzsche’s strong man does not fear misfortune and comes to represent the will 
to power—a trait that Nietzsche deems essential to life.61 The will to morality is 
in this sense a mere veil over the countenance of the will to power and even the 
revolt of the oppressed is seen as its expression. However, since the will to power 
is not exclusive to one class, the oppressed man comes to “realize that he is in 
the same boat as the oppressor and that he has no prerogative over him, no higher 
status than him.”62 Upon losing belief in the legitimacy of his derision for the will 
to power, the oppressed man descends into hopeless desperation; the collapse of 
morality leads to the destruction of the oppressed.63 Nietzsche surmises that this 
“perishing presents itself as a—self-ruination, as an instinctive selection of that 
which must destroy…”64The elimination of the weak is an upshot of loss of belief in 
morality, which deprives them of their only solace. The overcoming of nihilism in 
this text takes place through a teleological destruction of the weak. 
A similar trajectory can be found in the Genealogy of Morals. Although the notion 
of the eternal return is largely replaced with that of the will to power in this text, 
the logic of selection and purging (more accurately, self-destruction) is still at 
work in this version of nihilism. The disenchantment from morality, as Nietzsche 
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unabashedly explicates, brings about the self-destruction of the oppressed, or 
makes the weak conscious of their own resentment as power-will [Machtwille]. 
Once the world emerges as the will to power, the weak find themselves in the 
same boat as the strong. This is an example of what makes Nietzsche’s radicalism 
‘aristocratic’, or his association with the ‘dictatorship of the elite.’ However, 
Nietzsche’s aristocratic radicalism, as Losurdo perspicuously points out, is fused 
with a curious Marxian quality, that is, the capacity “to decipher every domain of 
history, morals, religion, science, and art as a ‘status and class struggle’ [Stande-
und Classenkampf]—with the difference, however, of considering it ahistorically 
as an eternal struggle between masters and slaves.”65 We could indeed turn to the 
radical dimension of Nietzsche’s thought, which, in the words of Losurdo:
… highlights in a clear and pitiless way the weak points of the revolutionary 
project, and the democratic agitation for the ‘rights of man.’ The 
universalism which characterizes such a project and such agitation can 
easily assume an aggressive and imperial form, transforming into an 
instrument of domination.66
The encounter between Nietzsche and Lukács in a sense takes place in this space 
between revolution and reaction. As for the reactionary moment in Lukács, we 
have to turn to The Destruction of Reason, whereby he curiously calls Nietzsche 
a “Jekyll-and-Hyde character,” a decadent, and the founder of philosophical 
irrationalism whose philosophy more or less anticipated the emergence of 
Nazism. 67 He also refers to Nietzsche as a romantic anti-capitalist in this text, 
though he immediately tries to persuade readers of the former’s abandonment of 
romanticism later in life.68 Irrationalism in this book alludes to hostility towards 
the dialectical-historical concept of progress, which according to Lukács was 
coeval with the occurrence of the proletariat as an independent social force in 
the revolutions of 1848. So although Lukács’s comprehensive attack on Nietzsche 
takes as a point of departure the justifiable path of the latter’s abhorrence of the 
Paris Commune (in a sense, confirming Lukács’s view of Nietzsche as an advocate 
of the dictatorship of the elite), it falls prey to a unilinear conception of history 
as the development of the forces of production, not only towards a more equal 
but also a “culturally richer” life for the people. Oddly enough, even in the midst 
of this Stalinist, anti-Nietzschean harangue—i.e., where Lukács is supposed to 
be inclined towards the non-revolutionary realpolitik of Stalin—he is still not far 
from Nietzsche, as evident in his unceasing preoccupation with culture.69 
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Abiding with the young Lukács, however, as the main concern of this article, we 
may touch upon a ‘bad’ Nietzschean moment in an otherwise brilliant piece (“The 
Metaphysics of Tragedy”), which we have been considering. Nietzschean elitism 
is the downside of Lukács’s position in the following passage, whilst the more 
philosophically justifiable aspect is the distaste he shares with Nietzsche for the 
anti-tragic quality of modern, bourgeois notions of democracy: 
In vain has our democratic age claimed an equal right for all to be tragic; all 
attempts to open this kingdom of heaven to the poor in spirit have proved 
fruitless. And those democrats who are consistent about their demand for 
equal rights for all men have always disputed tragedy’s right to existence.70 
Lukács’s hesitation about the democratic tendency also stems from his conception 
of tragedy as a ‘will-to-form.’ “On Poverty of Spirit” (1912) is another early 
work in which Lukács portrays a hierarchical system reminiscent of Nietzsche’s 
hierarchization of values. In this work, which is written as a literary dialogue, 
Lukács goes as far as portraying a system grounded on a hierarchy of virtues 
belonging to different social estates, where a distinction is drawn between 
those with the capacity of being possessed by ‘Goodness,’ and those caught 
up within the boundaries of a sombre empirical life.  So Goodness (as a gift of 
grace) is differentiated from ordinary life. The dialogue hence revolves around 
a metaphysics of castes, reflecting different ‘castes’ of life: the caste of everyday 
life, the caste of ‘works,’ and the caste of ‘living life,’ which is the highest caste. 
Individuals can only live in accordance with the laws of their own caste, whilst 
women and men are differentiated from one another.71The main character in 
the dialogue finally commits suicide, because he does not believe himself to be 
capable of Goodness. 
This exposition of some examples of the reactionary moments in the thoughts 
of Nietzsche and Lukács was meant to further disclose the ambivalence that 
dwells at the heart of the category of romantic anti-capitalism. It so appears 
that the aristocratic Nietzsche is least reactionary and the communist Lukács is 
least Stalinist, when inebriated with their tragic vision. This vision was disavowed 
by the older Lukács, and yet, ultimately offered him a way out of political and 
philosophical determinism.  
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TRAGEDY, OBSOLESCENCE, REVOLUTION
In the most refined stage of his work, Lukács believed that the tragedy of a 
situation could be only comprehended from the point of view of its overcoming, 
albeit a revolutionary rather than utopian overcoming. A conception of tragedy as 
revolution, which came to grow stronger roots in the course of Lukács’s life, 
was by no means foreign to his early thinking. As he wrote in 1969, reminiscing 
on the old Heidelberg days, “a certain worldview,” which he considered to be 
“revolutionary,” had made him some sort of an outsider in the Max Weber circle. 
Unapologetically, he took issue with their “lack of a consistently tragic vision,” 
and particularly, Dilthey’s and Simmel’s tendency towards moral and human 
reconciliation [Versöhnung] with society.72 In an autobiography written near the 
end of his life, Lukács elaborated on this age-long tendency: “… Synthesis of 
the problematic of my childhood and youth: a meaningful life impossible under 
capitalism; the fight for such a life: tragedy and tragicomedy…”73  
The early Lukács’s proclamation of the impossibility of the tragic experiential 
form in the modern world was paradoxically coupled with his envisaging of tragic 
action in crisis in the wake of an event or rupture. This idea of formlessness of 
historical experience is indeed more congenial to Walter Benjamin’s thinking than 
existentialism.  In later Lukács, tragedy as the inevitable invariant of human 
condition increasingly gives way to tragedy as crisis or contradiction: 
…the real, dialectical analysis of human progress and its contradictions 
can only be undertaken from a point of view dominated by a belief in 
the ultimate victory of progress, despite all contradictions. Only the 
perspective of a classless society can provide a view of the tragedies to 
be encountered en route without succumbing to the temptations of a 
pessimistic romanticism.74
Toscano puts forward the thesis according to which tragedy should be treated 
“with respect to the historical form of collective action;” it must be thought as 
revolution and transition rather than “a warning against revolution—a thinking 
that can be threaded through Hegel, Marx, Lukács, C.L.R. James, Raymond 
Williams, Sebastiano Timpanaro and others.”75 Although tragedy invokes the 
impossibility of a position outside the contradictions of modernity, it is “only 
from the standpoint of revolution, and its practice, that these contradictions 
become tragic.”76 Recalling the distinction between ‘Romanticism’ and ‘the 
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romantic’ discussed earlier, a similar case could be observed apropos of the 
notion of tragedy. Rather than being concerned with tragedy as an art-form, 
Lukács theorizes a ‘metaphysics’ of the tragic in Soul and Form. Even so, what 
is the implication of a tragic vision for Lukács and his repressed romantic anti-
capitalism? We could propose that ‘the tragic’ in this context is the element that 
bridges the gap between politics and romanticism, making possible a ‘romantic 
politics.’ In a word, the tragic vision has the capacity to bestow on the romantic 
category a political significance. The tragic vision has the potential to conjure up 
the surplus in life and in so doing to overcome the occasionalist subjectivity (in 
Schmitt’s terms) and aestheticization of politics. 
Löwy argues that, at the age of eighty-three, “Lukács entered a new stage in his 
political-ideological development, which was, to a certain extent, a return to the 
revolutionary orientation of his youth.”77 Accordingly, although the Lukács of 
1969-71 cannot be the same person he was in 1919-24, near the end of his life 
he began to excavate and re-appropriate the ideas of his youth whose contours 
became visible in his defence of the 1968 movements, and particularly in his 
essay on Lenin (1968) where he “contrasts the socialist democracy of Lenin with 
Stalinist bureaucratic manipulation.”78 At this stage, Lukács brings out of the 
closet his old theoretical toolbox to discern the ‘living’ life of the Workers Soviets of 
the end of 19th and beginning of 20th century from the ordinary, ‘unliving’ life under 
capricious bureaucracy and bourgeois democracy. Löwy rightly insists on the 
eventual return of the romantic anti-capitalist bearings of Lukács’s thought, which 
had been bottled up throughout his Stalinist, realist years. In the context of the 
thesis put forward in this essay, this also means a return of the Nietzschean idea 
of “life against life.” Furthermore, we could pinpoint another return, evoking what 
has been omitted from this picture: Lukács’s passionate support of the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956. 
The idea of radical rupture or ‘miracle,’ elegantly delineated in Soul & Form, 
is once actualized in Lukács’s life with the event of the October Revolution— 
supplemented later with the collapse of the old order in Hungary (1918). After this 
event, the old despondency, which hitherto had its roots in actual capitalist social 
relations and absence of a subversive force (the absence of a value-creating force 
in Nietzsche’s terms), gives way to an immanent conception of emancipation, 
making tragedy possible in a new revolutionary key. “October gave the answer. 
The Russian Revolution was the world-historical solution to my dilemma,” 
Lukács remarks in the early 1970s.79 The heart of the matter is that the desire for 
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this conversion to communism—once the possibility of change was no longer 
remote as in the days of Soul & Form—dwelled in Lukács’s tragic ethico-political 
bearings (which, to a great degree, had its roots in the thought of Nietzsche) 
rather than a belief in scientific Marxism. We could also catch a glimpse of this 
tendency in his claim in the 1967 preface to History and Class Consciousness, where 
he emphasizes that right from the beginning his ethics “tended in the direction 
of praxis, action and hence towards politics.”80 Not only did Lukács’s tendency 
towards a romantic politics, coupled with a persistent, life-long ‘tragic vision,’ 
enable him to move beyond a neo-Kantian version of Marxism, but it offered him 
a way out of Stalinism and economic determinism later in life.
It seems, or so one could argue, that despite Löwy, Lukács’s reiteration of his 
tragic, revolutionary stance at the last stage of his life would do little to rescue him, 
as it echoed the sort of classical deathbed repentance of an old wolf who comes 
to regret the over-indulgence of his youth. In contrast to this rueful preaching 
of a tottering revolutionary, his participation in the Hungarian Revolution as a 
collective, world-historical experience had been a concrete anti-Stalinist praxis 
that, rather than being tragic merely in its proclamation of crisis (political 
romanticism), attempted to stretch tragedy towards the horizon of a struggle 
against the disorder. In brief, Lukács does not fail to act at this specific historical 
juncture—a reactivation of the truth of the October Revolution. This becomes an 
‘either/or’ matter for him. The definition of tragedy that emerges through this act 
is neither tragedy as an invariant of human condition, nor even as catastrophe, 
but tragedy as “instituting rupture” (in Badiou’s parlance), as an act of bringing 
out what within repetition remains unrepeatable. 
Having experienced loss in relation to the October Revolution, Lukács’s faith 
on the Hungarian Revolution—on the return of revolution after some three 
decades—is a (Benjaminian) “hope in the past.”81 Hope in the past, as Comay 
puts it, “…has nothing to do with nostalgia: it’s about extracting the critical 
resources of obsolescence itself. It’s about redeeming the belated possibilities or 
aborted futures of the past.”82 Such a loss can therefore “counteract every form 
of nostalgia and to fuel the desire for all revolutionary change.”83 At a time when 
Stalin had throttled the Revolution, Lukács was no doubt most conscious of 
revolution as a missed experience. Therefore, his wager was for a redemption that 
could only come too late: the brutal suppression of the Hungarian Revolution by 
the USSR led to his arrest and exile.84 Embodied in this instance, this tribute to a 
recommencement of the revolution, is the effectuation of a radical rupture at the 
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wake of an irrecoverable loss.
This affair has been hardly stressed in Lukács’s scholarship. Nevertheless, this 
fervour for the historical event in Hungary and the abandonment of—a pseudo-
Hegelian—historical determinism is indicative of the primacy of political rupture in 
his thought over the teleological penchant of scientific socialism, a tendency that 
has its roots in a transvaluation or transfiguration of reality as the only overcoming 
of nihilism. Lukács’s gesture evokes a praxis in the spirit of Nietzsche’s “dancing 
at the edge of the abyss,” while (re)turning Nietzsche against Nietzsche in its 
inversion of the aestheticization of politics. 
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